By Alpha Amadu Jalloh
Sierra Leone’s constitutional history reflects its ongoing struggle to balance power, legitimacy, and citizen participation. From the 1978 Constitution under Siaka Stevens, which consolidated authority and laid the groundwork for a one-party system, to the 1991 Constitution, which restored pluralism, independent commissions, and citizen sovereignty, the country has alternated between centralization and inclusion. Each constitutional moment has reflected a political choice about who governs, how authority is exercised, and whether citizens are participants or spectators. The proposed 2025 Constitutional Amendment Bill represents a profound structural shift that threatens the democratic progress that has been achieved under the 1991 Constitution.
The Bill is framed as a reform to modernize electoral processes, improve administrative efficiency, and reduce delays. Its language is technical and its justifications are procedural. It appeals to fatigue with litigation, delayed declarations, and logistical challenges. Yet constitutions are not technical manuals. They are political covenants. Beneath this façade lies a transformation that fundamentally alters the political cooperation and inclusive approach to the appointment of Commissioners of the Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone as outlined in the 1991 Constitution. Under the 1991 Constitution, electoral governance was designed as a shared political responsibility rather than a narrow administrative exercise. The stakes of this Bill are therefore systemic and far reaching, affecting not only elections but the nature of democratic legitimacy itself.
The Bill fundamentally changes the composition and legitimacy of the Electoral Commission. Under the 1991 Constitution, the Chief Electoral Commissioner and other members were appointed by the President after consultation with leaders of all registered political parties and subject to parliamentary approval. This process acknowledged a basic democratic truth: elections are political acts, not neutral administrative events. Their credibility depends on broad political confidence, not simply procedural correctness. Consultation ensured that even losing parties could accept outcomes because they trusted the institution administering the process.
In a highly polarized society where political competition is shaped by regional and ethnic identity within a party based system, this inclusive framework was not incidental. It was essential. It recognized that electoral peace in Sierra Leone depends as much on perception as on numbers. Removing this consultative mechanism undermines the core principles of democracy, erodes consensus building, and weakens public trust in electoral outcomes. It replaces shared ownership with imposed structure.
The 2025 Amendment removes direct party consultation and replaces it with a Search and Nomination Committee. This is not a technical adjustment. It represents a shift in democratic logic. Legitimacy is transferred from political recognition to administrative procedure. Consensus building becomes optional rather than foundational. Democracy is reframed as a managed process rather than an expression of citizen sovereignty. Authority over elections shifts away from political actors and voters toward committees and bureaucratic structures, echoing earlier patterns of centralized control, albeit presented in modern procedural language.
Presidential elections are similarly transformed. Under the 1991 Constitution, a candidate required fifty five percent of valid votes to win outright, or the top two candidates proceeded to a run-off election within fourteen days. The framework was clear, decisive, and designed to produce legitimacy through finality. Voters understood the rules. Outcomes were timely. Mandates were visible and comprehensible.
The 2025 Bill introduces multiple thresholds and layered procedures. A candidate must secure a simple majority nationwide and at least twenty percent of the vote in two thirds of districts. If no candidate satisfies these conditions, the Chief Electoral Commissioner submits the declaration to the Chief Justice, a three-day petition window opens, and the Supreme Court may review the process. Run-off elections may be invalidated, triggering fresh elections within sixty days, with all previous candidates eligible to contest again.
Elections that were once decisive now risk becoming prolonged cycles of legal and administrative intervention. This structure incentivizes delay, rewards fragmentation, and weakens voter clarity. Marginal candidates gain leverage not by persuading citizens but by preventing thresholds from being met. Strategic spoilers become valuable. Elections risk becoming procedural contests rather than civic determinations. The design mirrors historical strategies of power consolidation without formally banning opposition, ensuring control through complexity rather than coercion.
The role of political parties is also redefined. Under the 1991 Constitution, parties existed to represent ideas, mobilize citizens, and contest elections without fear of extinction. Pluralism was a right, not a reward for performance. Political competition was encouraged as a democratic good, not treated as a threat to be managed.
The 2025 Amendment conditions party survival on electoral performance, allowing deregistration if a party fails to win two consecutive general elections. Opposition becomes conditional. Political life becomes survivalist. Parties may abandon principle for expediency, merge for protection, or withdraw from contestation altogether. The state assumes authority over which political voices may continue to exist, reflecting mechanisms previously used to entrench dominant party control while preserving the appearance of competition.
Courts, which under the 1991 Constitution resolved disputes without becoming part of the electoral machinery, are now embedded in the process itself. Petitions are no longer exceptional events triggered by irregularities. They are anticipated stages in the electoral sequence. Authority shifts from voters to administrators and judges. Strategic litigation becomes more influential than genuine political persuasion. Delay becomes structural rather than incidental, weakening public confidence and exhausting civic participation.
A comparison with historical constitutions clarifies the danger. The 1978 Constitution concentrated power in the presidency and enabled one party dominance. Amendments in the 1980s further entrenched executive authority and weakened pluralistic checks. The 1991 Constitution deliberately reversed this trajectory by strengthening independent institutions, promoting political inclusion, and simplifying electoral outcomes. Legitimacy flowed from citizens and political actors, not from procedural complexity or judicial intervention.
The 2025 Bill revives elements of past centralization while presenting them as neutral reform. Opposition is not banned, but its survival is conditional. Citizen influence over electoral administration is reduced. Committees and courts are normalized as gatekeepers of political outcomes. Power is insulated rather than contested. History demonstrates that such mechanisms can produce dominant party systems without overt repression, gradually weakening competition, accountability, and democratic culture over time.
Even transitional arrangements in earlier periods, which concentrated authority temporarily, were often justified as exceptional responses to instability. The 2025 Bill, by contrast, embeds these controls permanently into the constitutional order. What is presented as efficiency becomes entrenchment. What is described as reform becomes restriction.
Given the scope of these changes, public approval through a referendum is essential. Citizens must decide whether such structural alterations align with democratic principles. Sovereignty cannot be replaced by administrative discretion. There are already concerns that census processes, voter registration, and demographic mapping could be manipulated to influence outcomes. Without robust safeguards, procedural control could predetermine results before citizens ever vote, hollowing out the idea of popular consent.
The moral implications are clear. The Bill does not abolish elections, but it risks making them inconclusive. It does not outlaw opposition, but it conditions its survival. Authority shifts from citizens to regulators. Complexity replaces clarity. Democracy is weakened not by force, but by design.
Parliament must reject this Bill outright. Incremental amendments are insufficient because the structural changes embedded in the Bill fundamentally alter electoral legitimacy, political competition, and citizen authority. Passing it would erode trust, deepen polarization, and entrench long term dominance under the guise of reform.
Civil society must act decisively. Media institutions, professional bodies, youth movements, religious leaders, and civic organizations must educate the public, scrutinize parliamentary proceedings, and demand transparency. No constitutional change of this magnitude should proceed without a referendum. Census and electoral processes must be protected from manipulation. Public consent, not bureaucratic control, must determine legitimacy.
International partners, legal experts, and regional bodies should be engaged to support transparency and accountability. Any attempt to bypass democratic safeguards must be documented and challenged. Vigilance is essential to prevent administrative discretion from becoming permanent political advantage.
Sierra Leone deserves an electoral system that produces clear outcomes, protects pluralism, and places authority firmly in the hands of citizens. The 2025 Constitutional Amendment Bill does the opposite. Rejecting it is not a partisan act. It is a defense of democracy itself.
The time to act is now. Parliament must uphold citizen sovereignty. Civil society must rise in defense of democratic structures. The people, not committees or courts, must determine political destiny. Anything less risks a slow and enduring erosion of Sierra Leone’s democracy.